In cases where companies have made such voluntary licensing commitments, the lack of transparency of licensing agreements for COVID-19 treatment products is significant. These initiatives are ad hoc initiatives and not a sustainable way to remove barriers to IP. Recognizing the need for new rules and disciplines with regard to (a) the applicability of the fundamental principles of GATT 1994 and relevant international conventions or conventions on intellectual property; Article 27 defines the patentability requirement for all technological inventions and deals with exceptions in a very limited manner, which does not reflect the balance of rights and obligations obtained in other WTO agreements such as GATT [Articles XX and XXI] and GATS [Articles XIV and XIV bis]. In these other agreements, exceptions apply in the form of general and security exceptions. The language used in these other agreements – Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent a Member from taking measures to: – recognize and take into account important public policy concerns (public interest and important national objectives); and it was an essential means of ensuring balanced agreements. These derogations are even more important in the TRIPS Agreement because, unlike other agreements, it mainly concerns private rights; Traditionally, intellectual property laws have contained provisions aimed at striking a balance between right holders and society. However, the TRIPS Agreement limits all limited exceptions that it attempts to avoid taking important public policy measures. 7. So far, discussions in the TRIPS Council have focused on two aspects. First, members` practices in implementing their commitments have been reviewed. Secondly, some mandated negotiations and verifications have been launched. An overview of the many issues raised by MEPs, in particular by MEPs from industrialised countries themselves, on legislation reviewed over the last four years yields an interesting result. These are the fact that the issues were all based on obligations relating to the minimum standards of protection under the Agreement; No questions are raised as to the extent to which the objective and principles of the agreement are transposed into law.

On the contrary, the exercise by members of legislative or administrative flexibility to take account of competing public values, such as the use of compulsory licences or use by the government, has been the subject of a few repeated follow-up questions aimed mainly at questioning the use of this flexibility. It is clear that the transfer and diffusion of technology and the resulting increase in trade were of little importance to the MEPs interviewed. It could therefore be argued that the TRIPS Agreement should not be transformed as a trade agreement, but as a means of enforcing private rights, regardless of their commercial impact. TRIPS conditions that impose more standards beyond TRIPS were also discussed. [38] These free trade agreements contain conditions that limit the ability of governments to create competition for generic drug manufacturers. In particular, the United States has been criticized for encouraging protection far beyond the standards imposed by TRIPS. U.S. free trade agreements with Australia, Morocco, and Bahrain have extended patentability by requiring patents to be available for new uses of known products. [39] The TRIPS Agreement allows for the issuance of compulsory licences at the discretion of a country. The more ad hoc conditions provided for in the free trade agreements between the United States and Australia, Jordan, Singapore and Vietnam have limited the application of compulsory licenses to emergency situations, antitrust measures and cases of non-commercial public use. [39] 9. The evolution of the dispute settlement body is no different.

In a major dispute concerning two provisions of public policy in a law on the patent of members, the dispute settlement mechanism seems to have reduced the objectives and principles in relation to the minimum standards of protection to secondary importance. . . .